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The Unfulfilled Promise of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304:
A Call for Pervasive Enforcement
J. Royce Fichtner, * John Rozycki, ** and Patrick Heaston***
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 2000's, the financial markets were devastated by a se-
ries of highly publicized corporate accounting scandals' at companies
such as Enron, Adelphia Communication, WorldCom, and Tyco.2 A
common thread among these scandals was the numerous instances
where corporations had published glowing financial statements that
materially overstated their true financial position. 3 Corporate officers
reaped the rewards of the overstated results by receiving large incen-
tive-based bonuses while simultaneously selling their personal shares
of stock in the company at higher-than-justified prices. 4 Later, when
corporations issued restatements that corrected the erroneous finan-
cial documents, shareholders watched the value of their shares plum-
met. 5 In some instances the restatements triggered a total collapse of
the corporation. By the spring of 2002, there was a pervasive push for
a governmental response.6
In March of the same year, President George W. Bush issued a ten-
point plan designed to improve corporate responsibility and help pro-
tect America's shareholders by providing better information to inves-
tors, making corporate officers more accountable, and developing a
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Drake University. The author would like to thank
Josephine Fichtner for her assistance on this project.
** Associate Professor of Finance, Drake University.
*** Aliber Professor of Accounting, Drake University.
1. Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms into Law; President Says Era of "False Profits"
Is Over, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A4.
2. John Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a Personal
Culpability Requirement, 59 Bus. LAw. 1005, 1005-18 (2004).
3. Id. at 1005-06 (describing the era and citing numerous primary sources documenting the
financial misstatements).
4. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: Executive Compensation; Enron Paid Huge Bo-
nuses in '01; Experts See a Motive for Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at Al; Gretchen
Morgenson, The King of Excess, and Other Standouts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at 3.1.
5. Kelsh, supra note 2, at 1006.
6. Allen, supra note 1, at A4.
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stronger, more independent audit system.7 One of the key tenets of
his plan was to make sure that "CEOs or other officers should not be
allowed to profit from erroneous financial statements."8 In April, the
House of Representatives made the first attempt to achieve these
goals by passing the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Respon-
sibility, and Transparency Act.9 While the Senate debated similar leg-
islation, the drumbeat of corporate scandals accelerated.10 Adelphia
announced that previously undisclosed loans and loan guarantees
would necessitate an accounting restatement and WorldCom similarly
announced that improper accounting measures would require a re-
statement of recent financial statements." Reacting to the increasing
media scrutiny, the Senate passed an even stronger bill that proposed
profound and sweeping regulatory changes. The Senate's version of
the bill, the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protec-
tion Act, better known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX"), passed
both houses of Congress by an overwhelming majority and was signed
into law by President George W. Bush in July of 2002.12
SOX created a "smorgasbord" of corporate governance rules, most
of which were designed to enhance the reliability and quality of the
information included in reports filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and prevent corporate and accounting fraud.' 3
These new rules were designed, in part, to make CEOs, CFOs, and
auditors more accountable for erroneous financial reports.1 4 One sec-
tion of SOX directly addressed the President's goal of preventing
CEOs and CFOs from profiting from erroneous financial state-
ments.' 5 Section 304 created an explicit procedure to disgorge or claw
7. The President's 10-Point Plan: Improving Corporate Responsibility and Protecting
America's Shareholders, WALL ST. J., March 6, 2002, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB1015460971646141720.
8. Id.
9. House Passes Bill to Change Regulation of Accounting Profession, CPA LETTER, (June 1,
2002); see also H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (Jan. 23, 2002) (engrossed House amendment).
10. Kelsh, supra note 2, at 1018.
11. Id.
12. The House voted 423-3 and the Senate voted 99-0. Kelsh, supra note 2, at 1007-08.
13. Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1077 (S.D. Cal. 2006); see Carnero v. Boston
Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2006) ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act ... is a major piece of
legislation bundling together a large number of diverse and independent statutes, all designed to
improve the quality of and transparency in financial reporting and auditing of public
companies.").
14. Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A New Ballgame
for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 75-76 (2003).
15. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 23 (2002) ("The bill therefore requires CEOs and CFOs to certify
their companies' financial reports, outlaws fraud and deception by managers in the auditing pro-
cess, prevents CEOs and CFOs from benefitting from profits they receive as a result of misstate-
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back a CEO or CFO's incentive-based compensation or ill-gotten
stock gains when such profits were based on inflated financial state-
ments that were later required to be restated to reflect the company's
true financial position.16
When it was first signed into law, section 304 presented a strong
stance against those who misrepresented their company's true finan-
cial position to the investing public. Its crisp language demanded swift
reimbursement from those most likely to directly profit from the erro-
neous financial statements, without the burdensome issue of proving
criminal fault. It also put the onus on the CEO and CFO to go be-
yond passive observation to actively search for potential sources of
fraud and misconduct.' 7 Despite its strong stance, legal commentators
warned that its broad and sweeping language left much room for judi-
cial interpretation.' 8
Perhaps because of the uncertainty behind its broad and ambiguous
language, the SEC ignored the deluge of financial restatements that
occurred after SOX had been signed into law' 9 and waited five years
to bring its first section 304 claim.20 Private parties were not so timid.
Numerous shareholder groups rushed to court with section 304 claims
in an effort to disgorge bonuses and stock profits from CEOs and
CFOs.21 None of these claims were successful because in each in-
stance the ruling court determined that shareholders had no right to
bring a section 304 claim. 22 The SEC finally brought its first section
304 claim in 200723 and has since brought a handful of enforcement
ments of their company's financials, and facilitates the imposition of judicial bars against officers
and directors who have violated the securities laws." (emphasis added)).
16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2014).
17. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 955-56 (2003).
18. See, e.g., Allison List, The Lax Enforcement of Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley: Why is the
SEC Ignoring its Greatest Asset in the Fight Against Corporate Misconduct?, 70 OHIo ST. L.J.
195, 205-06 (2009).
19. Elaine Harwood & Laura Simmons, The Tenth Anniversary of SOX: Its Impact and Impli-
cations For Future Securities Litigation and Regulatory Enforcement Activity, BLOOMBERG BNA
CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., at 2 (July 13, 2012) (showing that the number of restatements
filed by publically traded firms quickly rose from 163 in 2001 to 681 in 2006).
20. Gretchen Morgenson, Clawbacks Without Claws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2011, at BU1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/clawbacks-without-claws-in-a-sarbanes-
oxley-tool.html.
21. See, e.g., In re BISYS Group Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
22. In re BISYS, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 464; Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 657.
23. Press Release, SEC, SEC Settles with Mercury Interactive and Sues Former Mercury Of-
ficers for Stock Option Backdating and Other Fraudulent Conduct (May 31, 2007), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-108.htm ("The Commission's first ever use of Section 304 of
Sarbanes-Oxley - which allows the commission to seek the repayment of bonuses and stock sale
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actions against carefully selected defendants. Now, more than thir-
teen years after it was first signed into law, there is a small number of
court decisions that clarify some of its most conspicuous ambiguities.
This paper will detail the most perplexing interpretation questions
plaguing the statute and describe how a handful of court decisions
have strengthened its potential for future enforcement. The paper will
also highlight the lingering interpretation questions and predict how
courts might resolve these issues in the future. It concludes with a
criticism of the SEC's current trend of haphazardly enforcing section
304 and calls on the SEC for more systematic and pervasive
enforcement.
II. THE STATUTE AND ITS AMBIGUITIES
Section 304 states, in its entirety: 24
304. FORFEITURE OF CERTAIN BONUSES AND PROFITS
(a) Additional compensation prior to noncompliance with commis-
sion financial reporting requirements. If an issuer is required to
prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompli-
ance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial re-
porting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive
officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the
issuer for-
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based com-
pensation received by that person from the issuer during the
12-month period following the first public issuance or filing
with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial
document embodying such financial reporting requirement;
and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer
during that 12-month period.
(b) Commission exemption authority. The Commission may ex-
empt any person from the application of subsection (a), as it deems
necessary and appropriate.
Subsection A explains when the statute is applicable. The crucial
language of this section compels the CEO and CFO to reimburse the
issuer if it "is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to
the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct,
with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws." 25
profits received by CEOs and CFOs where financial results are later restated - reflects the
Commission's willingness to use all available remedies to deprive such senior officers of illicit
gains.").
24. 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2014).
25. Id.
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While section 304 appears succinct and straightforward, its sweeping
language is plagued with latent ambiguities.
First, the statute does not clarify who is in charge of its enforce-
ment. If the CEO or CFO does not willingly return the compensation
or stock gains, then who can bring a claim to enforce section 304 - the
board of directors, a shareholder via a derivative lawsuit, or the SEC?
Second, it does not specify whether section 304 imposes CEO and
CFO disgorgement in all instances in which there is a misconduct-
driven restatement, or whether it is contingent on proof that the CEO
or CFO was personally involved in the misconduct. 26 Compounding
the confusion in this area is the fact that the statute does not define
the term misconduct, so interpreters are left to speculate whether its
enforcement provisions are limited to circumstances where someone
knowingly prepared erroneous financial statements or whether it also
applies to circumstances where the mistakes could be attributed to
mere carelessness.
Other questions revolve around the meaning of the phrase "re-
quired to prepare an accounting restatement." If the company files a
voluntary restatement, does section 304 apply? Or, does disgorge-
ment extend to situations where the company has not yet filed a re-
statement? Could it be enough if the company is for some reason
required to file a restatement?
The last half of subsection A describes the monies the CEO or CFO
must actually return to the company. The disgorgement applies to any
bonus or other incentive-based compensation received by the CEO or
CFO during the twelve months following the issuance of the errone-
ous document. 27 It also applies to any profits realized by the CEO or
CFO from the sale of any securities during those same twelve
months.28 Unfortunately, this section also contains several issues that
are open to interpretation. There are legitimate questions as to what
of the varying types of compensation must be returned to the com-
pany. For example, does the disgorgement provision apply to com-
pensation that has been deferred? Another question concerns how to
calculate the total amount for reimbursement for "any profits realized
from the sale of securities of the issuer"29 during the twelve-month
period followed the erroneous statement. Specifically, is the dis-
gorgement limited to securities initially acquired as a result of service
to issuer or does it apply to all securities of the issuer, no matter when
26. Kelsh, supra note 2, at 1022-24.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(1).
28. Id. § 7243(a)(2).
29. Id.
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or how they were acquired? A follow-up question concerns the math-
ematical computation of the profit earned. Section 304 provides no
guidance on how the court should calculate the basis for the purpose
of determining profits realized during the twelve-month period. Is it
the original purchase price for the security or is it the value of the
security immediately prior to the filing of the erroneous financial
statement?
Subsection B gives the SEC the authority to exempt the disgorge-
ment when "necessary and appropriate." 30 This "prosecutorial discre-
tion"31 section presents no interpretation problems. However, as
demonstrated below, the unfettered authority, when coupled with the
SEC's aversion to use section 304 in all but the most blatant instances
of misconduct, and sometimes not even then, has made exemption the
rule, and the rare enforcement case the exception.
The following sections will address each of the above questions by
looking to the legislative history that led to section 304, the SEC's
particular choice of when to pursue section 304 claims, and the district
court rulings and appellate court decisions on those claims.
III. WHO CAN BRING AN ACTION To ENFORCE A
SECTION 304 CLAIM?
A plain reading of section 304 indicates that the company has a
right to the bonuses, incentive-compensation and stock profits earned
by a CEO or CFO during the twelve months after the erroneous fi-
nancial statement.32 The language of the statute appears to be self-
executing, simply stating that the CEO or CFO "shall reimburse the
issuer" for these ill-gotten gains. It is extremely rare that a CEO or
CFO would voluntarily return a bonus or turn-over any stock profits 3 3
and, regrettably, the statute does not specify who has the right to
bring a legal claim to enforce the disgorgement. A review of the legis-
lative history of the bill sheds some light on Congress' original intent.
The House's original plan for post-restatement disgorgements,
which was markedly different than the mechanism codified into law in
SOX section 304, merely directed the SEC to:
30. Id. § 7243(b).
31. Francine McKenna, A Closer Look at Clawbacks, (Oct. 23, 2011), http://
retheauditors.com/2011/10/23/a-closer-look-at-clawbacks/.
32. See Kogan, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 ("Section 304 creates a right in favor of issuers for
reimbursement of certain bonuses and profits") (emphasis in original); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F.
Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("Congress created a federal right in favor of issuers by speci-
fying they would receive the proceeds of officers' benefits").
33. Aaron Elstein, With Restatements on the Rise CEOs Could Face Payback Time, WALL ST.
,., April 9, 2002, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1018302787767131400.
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[C]onduct an analysis of whether, and under what conditions, any
officer or director of an issuer should be required to disgorge profits
gained, or losses avoided, in the sale of the securities of such issuer
during the six month period immediately preceding the filing of a
restated financial statement on the part of such issuer.34
This version gave the SEC the authority to choose to adopt a rule
requiring disgorgement, with some conditions. First, any SEC rule re-
quiring disgorgement had to "specify that the enforcement of such
rule shall lie solely with the commission, and that any profits so dis-
gorged shall inure to the issuer."3 5 Second, the House bill noted that
if the SEC adopted a disgorgement rule, it must also "identify the sci-
enter requirement that should be used in order to determine to im-
pose the requirement to disgorge." 36
None of this language made its way into SOX section 304. Instead
of giving the SEC the option to issue a rule on disgorgement, Con-
gress issued the rule itself. Notably, the specific details that the origi-
nal house bill mandated be included in any potential SEC rule - that
the SEC have the exclusive right to seek the disgorgement and that
the SEC specify the scienter requirement for disgorgement - were not
included in the version ultimately signed into law.3 7 Because there is
no statutory language directing who can bring an action to under sec-
tion 304, this naturally begs the question: Can someone besides the
SEC bring an action to disgorge the excess compensation and stock
profits? Could the issuer, or a shareholder filing a derivative action
on behalf of the issuer, pursue a section 304 claim? As explained be-
low, courts interpreting the statute have answered these questions
with a resounding "no."
Not surprisingly,38 there are no reported cases where a corporation
has ever attempted to bring a section 304 claim against its current or
former CEO or CFO. Therefore, there is no direct guidance on
whether the issuer could pursue a section 304 claim to recover the
bonus, incentive compensation, or stock profits. However, the ques-
tion has been answered indirectly via the large number of shareholder
groups that have attempted to bring section 304 derivative claims on
behalf of their respective corporations. 39 In each claim, the defending
34. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 12(a) (2002).
35. H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at §12(b)(4) (2002).
36. H.R. 3763, at § 12(b)(3). Scienter is defined as a mental state embracing "intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
37. Nader H. Salehi & Elizabeth A. Marino, Section 304 of SOX: New Tool for Disgorge-
ment?, N.Y. L.J., May 22, 2008.
38. Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 IowA J. CORP. L. 721, 732 (2011).
39. See, e.g., Pedroli ex rel. Microtune, Inc. v. Bartek, 564 F. Supp. 2d 683, 685-86 (E.D. Tex.
2008); In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223-25 (D. Mass. 2007); Kogan,
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CEO or CFO argued that the case should be dismissed because sec-
tion 304 does not contain an express private right of action.
The first case to squarely address this issue was Neer v. Pelino,4 0
where a Federal District court utilized the United States Supreme
Court's analysis in Cort v. Ash 41 to determine whether section 304
contains a private right of action. The court explained that the "cen-
tral inquiry" of the Cort test is "whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action." 42 The
Neer court noted that the text of section 304 does not expressly create
a private cause of action.43 The court then went on to look for an
implied right of action, looking to other sections of the Act for gui-
dance. 44 It pointed out that Congress created an express private right
of action in SOX section 306, which makes it unlawful for directors or
executive officers to trade any of the issuer's equity securities during a
pension fund blackout period if those securities were acquired in con-
nection with the director or executive officer's employment. 45 Section
306 specifies that if the issuer fails to bring an action to recover profits
within sixty days of a request to do so, "an action . . . [under] this
subsection may be instituted . . . by the owner of any security of the
issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer." 46 While both sections
304 and 306 provide for the issuer's reimbursement of ill-gotten gains,
the court noted the obvious contrast. Section 306 expressly creates a
private remedy with a specified statute of limitations, while section
304 does not.4 7
432 F. Supp. 2d at 1082; In re BISYS Group Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
40. 389 F. Supp. 2d at 657.
41. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court created a four-part test to
determine "whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one." The
Supreme Court explained the four parts to the test as the following series of questions:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted," (citation omitted) that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create such a remedy or to deny one? (citation omitted) Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plain-
tiff? (citation omitted) And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropri-
ate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? (citation omitted).
Id.
42. Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575
(1979)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 654.
45. Id. at 654-55 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(2)(B) (2002)).
46. Id.
47. Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
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The court then went on to analyze the legislative history behind sec-
tion 304 and noted that neither supporters nor opponents of the
House's version of SOX wanted to create a private right of action
under section 304.48 It then analyzed the Senate Report behind SOX
and concluded that the Senate never intended a private right of action
because nowhere within the report did it mention a private right of
action for section 304.49 Because the court could find neither an ex-
press right of action in section 304 nor an implied private right of ac-
tion in the legislative history of section 304, it ultimately dismissed the
shareholders' claim.50
The topic was also carefully addressed by the Ninth Circuit in the
case of In re Digimarc, where the issue was once again whether to
dismiss a derivative claim by shareholders under section 304.51 In this
case the court also utilized the Cort analysis to focus on text and struc-
ture of the statute, as well as the entire statutory scheme, to determine
whether Congress intended to provide shareholders with a private
right of action.52 The plaintiff shareholders claimed that Congress
must have implied a private right of action in section 304 because it
had specifically disclaimed a private right of action in the immediately
preceding section in SOX.53 Specifically, the shareholders pointed the
court to SOX section 303, which prohibits officers and directors from
"tak[ing] any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or
mislead any independent public or certified accountant" for the pur-
pose of creating disingenuous financial statements.54 The sharehold-
ers argued that because section 303 specifically disclaims a private
right of action, the lack of such a disclaimer in section 304 implies that
Congress intended such a private right of action in section 304.5s The
court was unpersuaded, noting that one cannot prove congressional
intent to create a private right of action merely "by pointing to other
sections in [SOX] that expressly disclaim private enforcement."5 6 The
court also went on to note that section 304 contrasts with section 306,
another nearby section that expressly gives the issuer a private right of
action against officers or directors trading securities during a blackout
48. Id. at 655-56.
49. Id. at 657.
50. Id. at 657-58.
51. See In re Digirnarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2008).
52. Id. at 1231.
53. Id. at 1232.
54. Id. at 1232 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a) (2014)).
55. Id.
56. In re Digimarc Corp., 549 F.3d at 1232.
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period.57 Under the court's analysis, if Congress had intended to
make section 304 enforceable via a private right of action, it could
have done so as it had done in the nearby section 306. Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit firmly denied that there is any private right of action in
section 304.58
All reported decisions on this matter conclude that section 304 does
not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action for share-
holders of the issuer. 59 Absent any extraordinary decision on the mat-
ter by the United States Supreme Court, this issue appears to be
settled. Only the SEC may bring a section 304 claim. While these
decisions provide clarity, they also seriously undermine the usefulness
of the statute. Neither the company,60 nor its shareholders, can bring
a section 304 claim to recapture unwarranted bonuses and stock sale
profits. The SEC, on the other hand, can bring a section 304 claim,
but there is little incentive to do so. Section 304 does not impose any
type of criminal penalty and there is no possibility of monetary gain
for the government or the SEC because any recovery is simply re-
turned to the issuer.
IV. DOES THE CEO OR CFO HAVE TO PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE
IN THE MISCONDUCT?
Arguably the most important aspect of section 304 - what is neces-
sary for proof of disgorgement - is drafted in a way that is, at best,
"inartful." 61 It states: "If an issuer is required to prepare an account-
ing restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a
result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under
the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial of-
ficer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer .... ."62
In its early attempts to apply section 304, the SEC did not force the
judicial branch to interpret whether the CEO or CFO must be person-
57. Id. at 1233.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Pedroli ex rel. Microtune, Inc. v. Bartek, 564 F. Supp. 2d 683, 685-86 (E.D. Tex.
2008); In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223-25 (D. Mass. 2007); Kogan,
432 F. Supp. 2d at 1082; In re BISYS Group Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005); see also, In re Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co. Derivative Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1233, at *23 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5,
2007).
60. Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incen-
tive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 Bus. LAw. 1, 2 (2008).
61. Matthew Boyle, They Didn't Earn It - And Should Return It, FORTUNE, May 11, 2006.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2014).
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ally involved in the misconduct. 63 The first section 304 enforcement
actions were limited to situations where the CEO or CFO was clearly
implicated in the alleged accounting misconduct64 and section 304 was
merely used as an additional mechanism to disgorge compensation
from allegedly culpable individuals.65
In 2009, the SEC brought its first disgorgement case where there
was no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of the CEO. The
defendant in this case was Maynard Jenkins, the CEO of CSK Auto
Corp ("CSK").6 6 CSK was a large automotive parts retailer that pur-
chased its inventory from various vendors.67 The accompanying ven-
dor allowances were very significant to the company's bottom line.6 8
In 2004, CSK issued an accounting restatement adjusting its net in-
come downward for 2003, 2002, and 2001 because of errors in the
amount of previously reported vendor allowances.69 CSK character-
ized these inaccuracies as "errors in estimation," "imprecise esti-
mates," and "bookkeeping errors."70 That restatement failed to paint
the true picture behind the reporting errors. It incorrectly character-
ized the errors as mistakes rather than fraudulent misstatements and it
failed to write-off all the vendor allowance receivables that were
known to be uncollectible at the time of the restatement.71 In 2007,
CKS filed a second restatement, revealing instances of accounting
fraud where the company had failed to write-off millions of dollars'
worth of uncollectible vendor allowances pursuant to Generally Ac-
63. Gretchen Morgenson, Clawbacks? They're Still a Rare Breed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2013,
at BUL.
64. William R. McLucas, Thomas W. White, Douglas J. Davison & Benjamin C. Brown, SEC
Wields the SOX 304 'Clawback Provision', LAw360, 1 (Dec. 6, 2010), https://www.wilmerhale.
com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale SharedContent/Files/Editorial/Publication/SEC%20Wields%
20The%20SOX%20304%20%27Clawback%27%20Provision.pdf.
65. Emily Rockwood, CEOs and CFOs Beware: Court Endorses SEC's Aggressive Use of Sec-
tion 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley To Clawback Compensation of Executives Who Did Not Engage in
Misconduct, CADWALADER, (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-
memos/ceos-and-cfos-beware-court-endorses-secs-aggressive-use-of-section-304-of-sarbanes-
oxley-to-clawback-compensation-of-executives-who-did-not-engage-in-misconduct.
66. SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072 (D. Ariz. 2010).
67. Press Release, SEC, Complaint for Violations of Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, at 1-2 (July 22, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp2ll49.pdf.
68. Id.
69. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-73.
70. Press Release, Orrick, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion by
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defen-
dant Maynard L. Jenkins, at 5 n.4 (Sept. 17, 2010), https://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publica
tions/Documents/3002.pdf.
71. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
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cepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 72 In doing so, the company
had overstated its pre-tax income by 47% in 2002, 43% in 2003, and
65% in 2004.73 The restatement indicated that certain personnel were
responsible for the improper accounting entries and that an audit
committee investigation had revealed an ineffective control environ-
ment which allowed for the inappropriate override of existing proce-
dures and internal controls.74
The SEC filed civil complaints and criminal indictments against se-
nior CSK officers implicated in the accounting fraud.75 The SEC also
filed a separate section 304 action against Jenkins, seeking to claw-
back the bonuses, incentive-based compensation, and profits he had
realized from the sale of CSK stock during the period following the
issuance of the 2002-2004 financial statements.76 The SEC did not al-
lege that Jenkins had personally participated in the accounting fraud
or that he had any knowledge of the fraud.77 Instead, the SEC alleged
that officers had actually concealed the scheme from Jenkins.78 Jen-
kins filed a motion to dismiss the section 304 claim, contending that
the action was improper because section 304 requires proof of per-
sonal misconduct by the CEO.7 9 He also argued that any claims of
liability that did not involve his personal misconduct violated due pro-
cess and imposed an impermissible penalty.80
The importance of the outcome of this ruling cannot be overstated.
Securities lawyers took notice of the SEC's bold move, and as one
contemporary noted, if the district court allowed the SEC's claim to
go forward, this would solidify section 304 as a "'no fault'
clawback." 81 The district court's ruling was nothing short of a home-
run for the SEC and the power of section 304. The district court de-
nied the motion to dismiss, noting that there was no question that the
72. Id.; Press Release, SEC, CSK Auto Corporation Form 10-K, at 40 (May 1, 2007), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives /edgar/data/1051848/000095015307000933/p73759e10vk.htm.
73. Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Opposition to Defendant Maynard L.
Jenkins's Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. Oct. 15, 2009)
(No. CV-09-01510-PHX-GMS), 2009 WL 3377248, at *2.
74. CSK Auto Corporation Form 10-K, at 3 (May 1, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1051848/000095015307000933/p73759e10vk.htm.
75. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp.2d at 1073; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation
Release No. 20933A / March 6, 2009, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20933a.htm.
76. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1074-75.
80. Id. at 1075-76.
81. Mark Schonfeld, SEC's First Use of SOX "Clawback" Against Uncharged Executive, GIB-
SON DUNN (July 27 2009), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/SECsFirst
UseofSOXClawbackAgainstUnchargedExecutive.aspx.
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plain language of section 304 and the legislative history behind it sub-
jects the CEO to disgorgement even if he or she was unaware of the
misconduct leading to the erroneous financial statements. 82 The court
noted that "[w]hen a CEO either sells stock or receives a bonus in a
period of financial noncompliance, the CEO may unfairly benefit
from a misperception of the financial position of the issuer that results
from those misstated financials, even if the CEO was unaware of the
misconduct leading to misstated financials."83 The court pointed out
that other securities laws already provide criminal and civil penalties
for knowing misconduct by the CEO or CFO. Therefore, section 304
would be redundant if it also required evidence of personal miscon-
duct. 84 The court also noted that the statute is designed to promote
vigilance when it stated that "[s]ection 304 provides an incentive for
CEOs and CFOs to be rigorous in their creation and certification of
internal controls by requiring that they reimburse additional compen-
sation received during periods of corporate noncompliance regardless
of whether or not they were aware of the misconduct giving rise to the
misstated financials."85 This vigilance is solidified by SOX section
302, which requires that the CEO and CFO certify that they are re-
sponsible for the existence, design, and operation of effective internal
controls that provide assurances as to the accuracy of the company's
financial statements.86 After the court denied his motion to dismiss,
Jenkins eventually settled the case and agreed to return $2.8 million in
bonus compensation and stock profits that he received while the com-
pany was committing accounting fraud.87
Two other federal district courts have followed Jenkins' lead and
found that the misconduct of the issuer, rather than direct proof of
personal misconduct by the CEO or CFO, is the trigger for a section
304 claim.88 While the decisions in these cases are compelling, it is
important to note that none of these decisions constitute binding legal
precedent. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any of the circuit
82. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp.2d at 1075-76.
83. Id. at 1075.
84. Id. at 1077 n.2.
85. Id. at 1077.
86. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2014)).
87. Former CEO to Return $2.8 Million in Bonuses and Stock Profits Received During CSK
Auto Accounting Fraud, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 15, 2011), http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-243.htm.
88. SEC v. Baker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161784, at *13 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2012); SEC v.
Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867 at 886 (N.D. Tex. 2011) ("Section 304 contains no personal
wrongdoing element").
61
62 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 14:49
courts have ruled on this issue and there are some lingering arguments
that the appellate courts might choose to address in the near future.89
V. WHAT IS MISCONDUCT?
Section 304 is triggered by the need to issue a restatement 90 due to
"misconduct." Unfortunately, nowhere in SOX does Congress define
the term "misconduct." 91 The full text indicates that the disgorgement
provisions only apply when the restatement arises from misconduct
that leads to material noncompliance with financial reporting require-
ments.92 Courts have not specified a uniform standard for the nature
and degree of misconduct needed to maintain an action under section
304.93 At most, one court stated "[t]he plain language of the statute
indicates that the purpose of the Act is to punish 'misconduct,' not the
mere decision to restate financial reports." 94
Legislative history provides little insight. One early version of the
bill passed by the House used the verbiage "extreme misconduct," 95
but the extreme qualifier was not included in the Senate's final version
of SOX.96 One might surmise that misconduct requires proof of scien-
ter, which is defined as a mental state embracing "intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." 97 The original bill passed by the House di-
rected the SEC to "identify the scienter requirement that should be
used in order to determine to impose the requirement to disgorge."98
However, the final version passed into law ultimately removed this
language and left section 304 without any scienter requirement. A
89. In Baker, the defendant tried to leverage the Ninth Circuit's language labeling section 304
actions as "equitable" disgorgements to argue that section 304 therefore requires proof that the
CEO or CFO was actually engaged in the wrongdoing, as is generally required for a court to use
its power to order an equitable disgorgement remedy. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161784, at *18-19
(citing SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978)). The district court disagreed, finding
that section 304 is a statutorily created cause of action specifically ordering disgorgement; it is
not just a remedy fashioned by a court that is naturally bound to find some level of wrongdoing
before crafting a remedy. Baker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161784, at *22. However, some com-
mentators point out that this issue is still subject to dispute. Daniel R. Bryer, The Culpability of
Corporate Officers under the Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley in a Post-Jenkins World, 12
J. Bus. & SEC. L. 1, 15-17 (2011).
90. FASB Accounting Standard Codification 250-10-20 defines a restatement as "The process
of revising previously issued financial statements to reflect the correction of an error in those
financial statements."
91. Bryer, supra note 89, at 18.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2014).
93. Bryer, supra note 89, at 18.
94. In re AFC Enter., 224 F.R.D. 515, 521 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
95. See Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 656 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
96. Id. at 657.
97. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
98. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 12(b)(3) (2002).
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review of other securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 reveals that this is not unique to section 304, as scienter is not
required for some other types of actionable misstatements. For exam-
ple, the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically found that the SEC need
not prove scienter to establish a person's liability under sections
17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities and Exchange Act, which prohibit a
person in the offer or sale of securities from obtaining money or prop-
erty by material misrepresentation or omission.99
Because section 304 does not contain an explicit scienter require-
ment, and legislative history is silent on the issue, it is left open for
speculation whether lesser conduct, such as mere negligent behav-
ior,100 would be enough to constitute misconduct under section 304.
The SEC has not aggressively tested the boundaries of what consti-
tutes misconduct. Instead, it has focused on situations where the mis-
conduct was a clear violation of standard accounting practices and
always rooted in deceit.101 Examples of cases where the SEC has al-
leged misconduct under section 304 include situations where compa-
nies overstated inventory values, 102 falsified journal entries, 03
falsified timecards to achieve quarterly revenue and margin targets,1 04
and improperly backdated stock options.1 05 As this line of section 304
cases demonstrates, misconduct certainly includes conscious actions
involving scienter. Nonetheless, the absence of any scienter require-
ment in the statute itself suggests that it could apply to lesser forms of
misconduct, such as carelessness, as well. Dictum from one district
court judge suggests that the SEC might win such a case. As stated by
the court, "[s]ection 304 does not elaborate on what sort of miscon-
duct is necessary, so the pay back remedy could be applied if any mis-
conduct, however slight, leads to an accounting restatement."1 06 One
99. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) ("It is our view, in sum, that the language of § 17
(a) requires scienter under § 17 (a)(1), but not under § 17 (a)(2) or § 17 (a)(3) [of the Securities
.Exchange Act of 1934]"); SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 412, 423 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) ("Scienter need not be proven, however to establish a violation of Sections 17(a)(2) and
(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), which respectively prohibit a person in the offer or sale of securities from
obtaining money or property by material misrepresentation or omission and from engaging in
any act that operates as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.").
100. List, supra note 18, at 207.
101. Salehi & Marino, supra note 37.
102. SEC v. David H. Brooks, Lit. Release No. 20345 (Oct. 25, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2007/ Ir20345.htm.
103. Id.
104. SEC Charges Software Company in Silicon Valley and Two Former Executives Behind
Fraudulent Accounting Scheme, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease /Detail/ PressRelease/1370543035992.
105. SEC v. Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867, 871 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
106. In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 224 (D. Mass. 2007).
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legal commentator similarly noted that, "[a]t some level, every re-
statement not caused by a change in accounting rules can be deemed
to be a result of misconduct."107 Industry specific characterizations of
misconduct in the accounting profession include descriptions such as
acts carried out in the performance of a management accountant's
professional occupation that fall below the standard expected of a rea-
sonably competent management accountant with specific listed exam-
ples of inadequate record keeping and incompetence. 108 While CEO's
and CFO's might claim it is unfair to take bonuses and stock profits
when there is no proof that anyone within the company intended to
deceive the investing public, this interpretation would not conflict
with the President's original plan to make sure that key officers do not
"profit from erroneous financial statements."1 09 Other securities laws
impose civil or criminal penalties for intentional deceit;1 0 section 304
merely requires the CEO and CFO to return bonuses and stock prof-
its that were attributable to incorrect financial measurements.
Eventually, the SEC may push the issue and begin to bring such
section 304 actions. As noted by one former employee of the SEC
enforcement division, prior to 2013 there were ongoing discussions
within the SEC as to whether mere negligence was enough to trigger a
section 304 disgorgement."' This same former employee predicted
that the "next horizon" for section 304 cases would "be negligence-
based cases without regard to fraud."11 2 In such cases the SEC could
win disgorgement merely because the issuer did not have proper con-
trols in place to prevent or catch any careless accounting. Even
though this fits within the overall tenor of SOX enforcement under
other sections of SOX, such as section 302, which mandates a set of
internal procedures designed to ensure accurate financial disclo-
sure,11 3 the current SEC leadership appears to have no desire to pur-
sue such actions. Instead, SEC leaders still battle over whether they
107. Kelsh, supra note 2, at 1009.
108. See What is Misconduct?, CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AccouNTANTs,
http://www.cimaglobal.com Professional -ethics/Conduct/Misconduct/ (last visted Oct. 31, 2015).
109. The President's 10-Point Plan Improving Corporate Responsibility And Protecting
America's Shareholders, supra note 7.
110. If a CEO is actually aware of misconduct that results in misstated financial statements, he
or she may be responsible for civil and criminal penalties. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78u(d), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14.
111. David McCann, More Clawbacks Likely In Store, CFO, (May 23, 2013).
112. Id.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4) (mandating that key officers are "responsible for establishing and
maintaining internal controls" and "have designed such internal controls to ensure that material
information relating to the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such of-
ficers by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic reports
are being prepared.").
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should pursue claims against CEO's or CFO's who were not person-
ally involved in blatant misconduct by their employees.1 1 4
VI. WHAT DOEs "REQUIRED" MEAN?
Section 304 mandates that the CEO and CFO shall reimburse the
issuer if the "issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement
due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of miscon-
duct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities
laws[.]"11 5 The use of the term "required" complicates the interpreta-
tion of this statute. It is unclear whether the term "required" compels
the SEC to prove that the company was somehow compelled to file
the restatement, instead of choosing to do so voluntarily. Another
point of contention is whether the term "required" allows for section
304 disgorgement even if the company refuses to file a restatement.
There is a legitimate legal argument that the term "required" cre-
ates two categories of restatements: those that are required, or com-
pelled, and those that are voluntary. Under this theory, the CEO or
CFO would only be liable under a section 304 claim if there was proof
that the "issuer [was] required to prepare an accounting restatement."
Conversely, if the restatement was filed voluntarily, then the CEO or
CFO would not have any section 304 liability. At least one court has
tacitly recognized this distinction and broke the test down into two
elements. In SEC v. Shanahan,"6 the SEC brought an action against
Michael Shanahan, the CEO of Engineered Support Systems, Inc., al-
leging multiple fraud and insider trading violations related to his per-
sonal involvement in backdating stock options and the corresponding
concealment of material amounts of compensation paid to its top ex-
ecutives.1 17 The district court judge interpreted the rule by stating
that the "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of Section 304 is
that, before penalties may be imposed, an issuer must be compelled or
ordered to prepare a financial restatement and must actually file the
restatement."I 8 Unfortunately, the court never considered the cir-
114. Kara Scannell, Clawbacks Divide SEC: Aguilar Pushes Harder Line for Executives at
Accused Firms, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2010), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB1000142405274870398830457541367178 6664134. The commissioners have split along party
lines in cases involving CEOs or CFOs who did not participate in wrongdoing. Jesse Westbrook,
SEC Rift on When to Claw Back Bonus May Leave Policy in Limbo, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5,
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-08-06/u-s-regulators-said-to-debate-when-
it-s-appropriate-to-claw-back-bonuses.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2014).
116. 624 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (2008).
117. Id. at 1075-76.
118. Id. at 1078.
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cumstances in which a company would be required or compelled to
prepare an accounting restatement because the court dismissed the
section 304 claim for the reason that the company had never issued a
restatement. 119
While the Shanahan court provided no guidance as to how the SEC
could prove that the issuer was ordered or compelled to file a restate-
ment, other commentators have tried to fill in the gaps by speculating
as to how courts might draw the line between a voluntary restatement
and a required restatement. One hypothesized that a restatement
would be categorized as "required" if there was evidence that the re-
statement was compelled by the company's independent auditor.1 20
Another posited that a restatement would be "required" if the SEC
threatened an enforcement action unless there was a restatement or if
the SEC refused to declare a registration statement effective under
the Securities Act of 1933 unless there was a restatement of a previous
financial statement.121
In two different cases, CFOs have seized upon this "required" lan-
guage and argued their company's restatements were "voluntary" and,
therefore, negated any section 304 claim. In both cases the argument
proved unsuccessful. In SEC v. Jasper, the SEC brought a civil en-
forcement action against the CFO of Maxim, alleging clear instances
of accounting fraud through backdating options to employees. 122 A
jury found Jasper liable for, among other things, committing fraud by
participating in a scheme to overstate his company's net income, falsi-
fying his company's books and records, and aiding and abetting the
company's filing of materially false and misleading reports with the
SEC.1 23 The district court barred Jasper from serving as an officer or
director of a publicly traded company for two years and imposed a
civil penalty of $360,000.124 The court also ordered him, pursuant to
119. As described by the Government Accounting Office, "A financial statement restatement
occurs when a company, either voluntarily or prompted by auditors or regulators, revises public
financial information that was previously reported." GAO, Financial Statement Restatements:
Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges (Oct. 4, 2002), at 1
n.1, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/236067.pdf.
120. See Sarbanes-Oxley Requires Disgorgement of Bonuses and Profits in the Event of a Fi-




121. Stanton P. Eigenbrodt, The Chilling Effects of Disgorgement and a Temporary Freeze:
Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 304 and 1103, JOURNAL REPORTS: LAW AND POLICY, at 2 (May 2004),
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/Eigenbrodt_5_2004.pdf.
122. SEC v. Jasper, 678 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
123. Id. at 1121-22.
124. Id. at 1122.
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section 304, to reimburse the company for $1.8 million in bonuses and
profits from the sale of Maxim stock that he received during the pe-
riod that he certified Maxim's false financial statements.125
Jasper appealed, claiming that the jury decision was not specific
enough to support a section 304 disgorgement because "the jury was
never asked to consider whether Maxim was 'required' to restate its
financials 'as a result of misconduct.' "1 26 Unfortunately, the Ninth
Circuit did not address the issue of whether the SEC had to prove that
the company was 'required' to issue the restatements. Instead, it dis-
missed the argument by noting that disgorgement was an "equitable"
rather than a "legal" remedy and that "equitable" remedies do not
necessitate a full jury trial to find all facts necessary for the action.1 27
In SEC v. Geswein,128 the CFO filed a motion to dismiss the section
304 claim on the basis that the SEC had failed to "allege that [the
issuer] was 'required' to prepare an accounting restatement."1 2 9 The
magistrate judge swiftly dismissed this argument, simply noting that
the issuer had issued a restatement and remarking that "[t]his court
does not find that the word 'required' is limited to actions compelled
by the SEC or another agency. "A company may be 'required' to
restate its financials in order to maintain proper compliance with
GAAP."1 30 Under this judge's standard, the mere filing of the re-
statement so as to maintain proper compliance with GAAP would sat-
isfy any requirement standard in section 304.
While the Shanahan decision and its dual requirement of proving
both that the restatement was filed and that it was "required" to be
filed still stands, the Geswein decision more accurately reflects the ma-
jority of the case law in this area. In practice, most courts simply over-
look the term "required" and merely focus on whether there was a
restatement.13' This interpretation may reflect Congress's true intent.
The Senate Committee Report makes no mention of proof of a "re-
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1130.
127. Jasper, 678 F.3d at 1130.




131. For example, in SEC v. Baker, the district court stated that the SEC had pled the requi-
site elements of a section 304 claim and then discussed how each element had been satisfied.
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161784 at *9. The court made no reference to the term "required" or
"compelled" when discussing the restatement. Id. The court only stated "[t]here is no question
[the issuer] had to file restatements for the periods in question." Id. A fair reading of the con-
text of this statement indicates that the court was content that the element was satisfied merely
because the restatement was filed. See id.
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quired" restatement when it described the bill in its Senate Report:
"The bill requires that in the case of accounting restatements that re-
sults from material non-compliance with SEC financial reporting re-
quirements, CEOs and CFOs must disgorge bonuses and other
incentive-based compensation and profits on stock sales, if the non-
compliance resulted from misconduct." 132 This interpretation is also
practical because the decision to file a restatement is not made lightly.
While companies may voluntarily file restatements pursuant to com-
ments and suggestions from the SEC in a securities offering133 or upon
the advice of a new accounting firm,134 companies will only do so if
absolutely necessary because research has shown that restatements of
financial statements result in a substantial loss of market value, de-
creases in expected future earnings, and increases in the firm's cost of
equity capital.1 35 Because a corporation will not amend its financial
statements unless it somehow believes it is absolutely necessary to do
so, it is logical that courts have not devoted significant judicial energy
towards determining whether the corporation was actually compelled
to issue the restatement.
Another interesting interpretation of the term "required" is that it
allows for section 304 claims even if the issuing company has refused
to file a restatement. This argument is appealing because it would be
too easy for a CEO to avoid personal liability if one only had to refuse
to file a restatement and, as in the recent case of AgFeed Industries
Inc., simply let the company fall into bankruptcy.1 36 This argument
first surfaced in Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana v.
Hunter,137 where the Fourth Circuit reviewed a district court decision
that dismissed a shareholder derivative lawsuit based on allegations of
intentional misconduct by key officers that led to misleading financial
statements. In this case, the shareholders had brought a handful of
claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 and
132. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 26 (2002).
133. The SEC Division of Corporate Finance reviews selected financial statements and, on
occasion, "suggests" that a company revise its financial statements. See generally Division of
Corporation Finance, http://www.sec.gov/ divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm#.VPDVubHnacw
(last visited July 7, 2015).
134. JAMES REDA, STEWART F. REIFLER & MICHAEL STEVENS, THE COMPENSATION COM-
MITTEE HANDBOOK 196 (2014).
135. Paul Hribar & Nicole Thorne Jenkins, The Effect of Accounting Restatements on Earn-
ings Revisions and the Estimated Cost of Capital, 9 REV. ACCOUNT. STUD. 337, 337-38 (2004);
Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Vernon Richardson & Susan Scholz, Determinants of Market Reactions to
Restatement Announcements, 37 J. ACCOUNT. & ECON. 59, 59-60 (2004).
136. Complaint, SEC v. AgFeed Industries, Inc., at 7 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2014/comp-pr2014-47.pdf.
137. 477 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 2007).
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an accompanying section 304 claim.1 38 The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims because it found
that there were inadequate allegations of misconduct and insufficient
proof that the company had issued misleading financial statements. 139
The court then briefly addressed the shareholders' claim that section
304 damages were appropriate, due to numerous alleged GAAP viola-
tions in the financial statements, which the shareholders claimed "re-
quire[d]" the company to issue restatements, even though the
company had never filed a restatement.1 40 The circuit court specifi-
cally avoided ruling on the issue of whether a restatement must be
filed in order to pursue a section 304 claim.1 41 Instead, the court
pointed to the insufficient proof that the company had presented erro-
neous information in its financial reports and found that "the com-
plaint does not adequately allege that any restatement is required."1 4 2
In the aforementioned case of SEC v. Shanahan, a district court
judge squarely ruled upon this issue and provided a definitive an-
swer. 143 The SEC sought to use section 304 to claw-back incentive
compensation payments and stock sale profits received by the CEO
after the company had issued financial statements that concealed the
backdated stock options.1 44 The CEO filed a motion to dismiss the
section 304 claim, noting that the issuer had never filed a restate-
ment.145 The SEC countered that section 304 does not explicitly re-
quire a restatement.146 It argued that the text of the statute merely
calls for disgorgement if the issuer is "required to prepare an account-
ing restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a
result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under
the securities laws."1 47 The SEC argued that because "Engineered
Support's 2002 financial statement contained material errors, restate-
ment was required under general accounting principles, and thus Sec-
tion 304 applies."1 48 The district court noted that the Eighth Circuit
had never ruled on the issue of whether section 304 requires the actual
138. Id. at 168-69.
139. Id. at 183-84.
140. Id. at 188-89.
141. Id. at 189. (The court also specifically avoided ruling on whether a private right of action
was available under section 304.) Teachers' Retirement System, 477 F.3d at 189.
142. Id.
143. Shanahan, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1077-78.
146. Id. at 1078.
147. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2014)).
148. Shanahan, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
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filing of restated accounting reports.149 The court then made a con-
clusory statement granting a motion to dismiss the section 304 claim,
indicating that the "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of sec-
tion 304 is that, before penalties may be imposed, an issuer must be
compelled or ordered to prepare a financial restatement and must ac-
tually file the restatement."15 0 The court did not provide detailed rea-
soning for this decision. Instead, it merely cited to a treatise, which
stated that the company must file a restatement, and cited the Senate
Report discussing section 304.151
These two cases constitute the full extent of any judicial analysis as
to whether a restatement must be filed prior to a section 304 claim.
Although one district court judge has ruled that a restatement is a
precondition to a section 304 claim,1 52 the judge's decision holds no
precedential value and the lack of any substantial analysis in his deci-
sion provides little support for future jurists. On the contrary, the
Fourth Circuit's ruling on this issue suggested that a section 304 claim
might be able to proceed absent a restatement, so long as the plaintiff
could prove that a statement was for some reason "required." 153 Al-
though the Fourth Circuit ultimately decided that the shareholder
plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege that a restatement was re-
quired under the circumstances of that case, it is likely that the SEC,
with its extensive experience analyzing and commenting on corporate
financial statements, could present a much more compelling argument
that a section 304 claim is appropriate, even though the issuer never
issued an accounting restatement.
In summation, there is no definitive answer as to how future courts
will interpret the term "required" in the context of the SEC's proof
requirements for section 304 claims, but there are three possible
scenarios.
First, future courts might allow the SEC to pursue a section 304
claim even if the company did not file a restatement. Under this sce-
nario, the SEC would need to prove that the issuer was required to
file a restatement, but chose not to do so. This argument has sparked
two reported decisions. In one, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The citation to the Senate Report merely noted in a parenthetical citation that "legis-
lative history indicates Congress contemplated the statute's applicability only in terms of 'ac-
counting restatements that result from material non-compliance,' rather than cases where there
should have been an accounting restatement because of material non-compliance." Id. (citing S.
REP. No.107-205, at 53 (2002)).
152. Shanahan, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
153. Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 189 (4th Cir. 2007).
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avoided directly ruling on this issue, but did dismiss the case for failing
to allege enough misconduct to "require" a restatement.154 In the
other, a district court judge expressly held that a restatement was re-
quired for section 304 liability. 155 Because this decision is not binding
on other courts, there is no controlling precedent on this issue. It is
difficult to predict whether future courts will allow section 304 actions
without a restatement, but the SEC seems to be willing to press the
issue. In 2014, the SEC filed a section 304 claim against a company
that prepared a draft restatement, but filed for bankruptcy prior to the
filing of the actual restatement. 156 Although this case has not sparked
a reported decision, it appears that the SEC still believes that the term
"required" serves as an exception to any actual restatement require-
ment. Future litigation in this area is likely.
In the second scenario, future courts might require that the SEC
prove both that the company filed a restatement and that the restate-
ment was somehow "required." This standard has been addressed in a
handful of federal district court decisions, but none provide any gui-
dance as to how the SEC could prove that the restatement was "re-
quired." At most, a magistrate judge ruled that filing a restatement to
remain in compliance with GAAP standards was sufficient proof to
satisfy the "required" element. However, this decision does not con-
stitute binding authority. 57
This decision leads to the final scenario, where courts will effec-
tively ignore the term "required" so long as the issuer filed a restate-
ment. Because the stock market punishes issuers who restate prior
financial results, it is likely that courts will find the mere act of restate-
ment to be sufficient proof that the issuer was "required" to issue the
restatement. Based on a review of all reported section 304 decisions,
and the rarity in which the issue is even broached by the court, the
authors find this to be the most likely scenario. As of the writing of
this paper, the use of the term "required" provides virtually no obsta-
cle to the SEC's pursuit of a section 304 claim.
VII. WHAT COMPENSATION Is SUBJECT To DISGORGEMENT?
Section 304's disgorgement provision applies to "any bonus or other
incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by [the CEO
or CFO] from the issuer during the 12-month period following the
154. Id.
155. Shanahan, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
156. Complaint, SEC v. AgFeed Industries, Inc., at 7 (Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/2014/comp-pr2014-47.pdf (last visited Sep. 20, 2015).
157. S.E.C. v. Geswein, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111906, at 70.
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first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first oc-
curs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting
requirement."1 5 8 Enforcement questions still linger because there is
no definition as to what it means to "receive" compensation under this
statute. There is no dispute that if the CEO is awarded and accepts a
cash bonus during the twelve-month window this would constitute
receipt.
This was the case in Jasper, where the district court entered judg-
ment disgorging the CFO of cash bonuses of $207,466, $646,447, and
$465,212 that were received during the fourth quarters of the years
spanning 2003-2005.159 Each of these disgorgements related back to
an erroneous financial statement filed during the year of the bonus. 160
A more vexing question would be whether the receipt requirement
would be applied to a cash bonus that accrued during the twelve-
month period but was to be paid on a later date, outside the twelve-
month period, under a deferral arrangement.161 Neither the courts,
the SEC, nor legislative history provide any guidance on this subject,
but it seems unlikely that the SEC would simply ignore these deferred
payments. Otherwise this would be a simple loophole to avoid any
possible future disgorgement actions.
Another question is whether the term "received" would apply to
compensation awards that are subject to multi-year vesting require-
ments. For example, if the CEO or CFO was granted options to
purchase stock at a future date that would lie outside of the twelve-
month window, would the future exercise of those options be subject
to disgorgement then? Similarly, there is no guidance on this issue.
Until the issue is presented to a court for final ruling, CEOs and CFOs
are left to speculate as to what types of compensation deferrals may or
may not qualify for disgorgement.
VIII. How TO CALCULATE PROFIT FOR STOCK SALES?
Section 304's disgorgement provision also applies to "any profits re-
alized from the sale of securities of the issuer" during the twelve-
month period "following the first public issuance or filing with the
Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document em-
bodying such financial reporting requirement."1 6 2 This disgorgement
provision is very important because at least one empirical study con-
158. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(1) (2014).
159. SEC v. Jasper, 883 F. Supp. 2d 915, 932-33 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
160. Id. at 933.
161. REDA ET AL., supra note 134, at 197.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(1).
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firms that executives of firms accused of accounting irregularities were
more likely to have exercised their stock options shortly after the oc-
currence of the irregularity.1 63 However, the lack of detail in the dis-
gorgement provision leads to more unanswered questions.
One question is whether the disgorgement is limited to securities
initially acquired as a result of service to issuer or whether it applies to
all securities of the issuer, no matter when or how they were acquired?
A literal interpretation of the statute suggests that all transactions of
securities of the issuer during the twelve-month period are susceptible
to disgorgement, regardless of whether the securities were acquired as
a result of service to the issuer. This is in stark contrast to SOX sec-
tion 306(a), where the Act specifically limits the prohibition on selling
securities during a pension plan blackout period to only those securi-
ties acquired by the director or executive officer in connection with his
or her service as a director or executive officer.1 64 Because section
304 contains no such limitation, it is likely that any security previously
acquired by the CEO or CFO, which is then sold during the twelve-
month period following the erroneous filing, would be subject to dis-
gorgement, regardless of whether the CEO or CFO had purchased the
stock on his or her own or whether it had been awarded by the
company.1 65
A second question pertains to the calculation of the amount of
profit subject to disgorgement. In order to calculate the "profits real-
ized from the sale of securities of the issuer,"166 it is necessary to com-
pare the sale price to the prior purchase price in a matching
acquisition. Section 304 provides no limitation on the timing of the
matching acquisition. Thus, the potential profit disgorgement could
capture profits that accrued long before the filing of the erroneous
report. For example, assume a CFO purchased 1,000 shares of com-
163. See Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on
Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 63 (2006) (finding that top managers of firms that experienced
accounting irregularities and were subsequently subject to SEC enforcement actions had exer-
cised their options in the misreported period on announcement day returns).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2014).
165. To date, there is no direct ruling on this issue, partly because most section 304 cases have
ended with a dismissal or settlement. The lone exception is SEC v. Jasper, which progressed all
the way through a jury trial and court ordered disgorgement. In that case, the only security sales
subjected to disgorgement were stock options exercised during the twelve-month period follow-
ing the erroneous filing. The reported decision does not detail how the court arrived at the
$550,514 disgorgement for securities sales during the twelve-month period. However, a review
of SEC filings during the pertinent period reveals that Jasper exercised his option to purchase
15,000 shares of company stock at the option price of $14.0625 and sold them at $50.7634 that
very same day, for a profit of $550,514. See SEC Form 4, Statement of Changes in Beneficial
Ownership (Nov. 10, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/ about/forms/form4data.pdf.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(2) (2014).
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pany stock in 2005 at $1 per share. The value of that stock rose con-
sistently during the next ten years so that on January 1, 2015 the
market value of that stock was $8 per share. On January 2, 2015 the
company files a statement with the SEC that contained erroneous in-
formation that materially misstated the company's financial position.
The market price of the stock rose and on January 10, 2015 the CFO
sold the stock for $10 per share. A literal interpretation of section 304
suggests that the entire $9 profit "realized from the sale of securities
of the issuer" 167 would be subject to disgorgement. A CEO or CFO
would surely argue that the entire gain is not subject to disgorgement;
the only potential disgorgement would be an increase attributable to
the erroneous information, which is $2 in this example. This argument
is bolstered by non-SOX disgorgement principles, where courts have
disgorged only those securities profits attributable to the erroneous
filing.168 Consider the example of measuring the difference between
the $10 sale price on January 10, 2015 and the market price of the
stock at a reasonable time after the public had been notified that the
January 2, 2015 filing was erroneous. It is unclear what courts will use
for the basis because almost every section 304 case has settled prior to
a final court judgment. However, if courts were to find that negli-
gence-based misconduct is sufficient for a section 304 disgorgement, it
would seem inequitable to disgorge the entire profits gained on the
stock sale, as illustrated by the $9 example above.
One final question arises as to the timing of the onset of the twelve-
month period. If an improper figure is initially reported in one time
period, and then restated again in a subsequently filed document, does
the twelve-month window restart when the second document is filed
or does the period only extend as far as twelve months from the date
of initial filing? This precise question was addressed in the case SEC
v. Mercury Interactive LLC. 16 9 In this case, the SEC sought section
304 damages based on the issuer's failure to properly record and re-
port back-dated stock options granted in the second quarter of
2002.170 Those expenses were not properly recorded in the August
2002 quarterly report filed with the SEC and the expenses related to
those second quarter 2002 option grants were also not reported in sub-
sequent SEC filings.17' The SEC argued that each subsequent failure
167. Id.
168. See Schwartz, supra note 60, at 15 n.95 (citing SEC v. Unioil, 951 F.2d 1304, 1306-08
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
169. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83719 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2009).
170. Id. at 18-20.
171. Id. at 19.
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to report those expenses started a new twelve-month clock from
which the disgorgement penalty should apply.172 The district court dis-
agreed, finding this interpretation implausible. 7 3 It concluded that
the beginning of the twelve-month clock is the first time this error was
improperly recorded, not each subsequent filing restating the same
error.174
IX. CONCLUSION
When SOX was signed into law, President Bush proclaimed that it
would protect investors by "improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures" through "tough new provisions to deter and
punish corporate and accounting fraud and corruption" that would
"ensure justice for wrongdoers, and protect the interests of workers
and shareholders."175 Section 304 was written as a self-executing stat-
ute, where disgorgement of bonuses and stock profits would follow a
restatement of financial information based upon misconduct. The
only exception to this disgorgement rested with the SEC, which was
granted the right to exempt a CEO or CFO when "necessary and
appropriate."1 7 6
Soon after it was signed into law, companies began issuing restate-
ments at an alarming rate.'77 CEOs and CFOs ignored section 304,
perhaps waiting to see whether the SEC would enforce the disgorge-
ment. For more than five years, it did not. Eventually, the SEC
brought a handful of enforcement actions. In the meantime, however,
exemption became the rule and the rare enforcement case became the
exception. Intuitively, section 304 should have reduced the gross
number of restatements and percentage of companies issuing restate-
ments because it created a very tangible incentive for more vigilance
from the top of the company. However, the opposite occurred. Even
though the total number of exchange-listed firms has declined since
SOX was signed into law, the total number of financial restatements
filed today far exceeds the numbers that came before SOX. In 2001,
172. Id. at 20-21.
173. Id. at 21.
174. Mercury Interactive LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83719 at 20-21. Ultimately, the court
dismissed the SEC's claim because "the SEC ha[d] not identified adequately a 'first public issu-
ance or filing' sufficient to identify a twelve-month period"' for which the defendants would be
obligated to reimburse bonuses and stock gains. Id. at 21.
175. George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (July 30, 2002),
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64514.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(b) (2014).
177. Harwood & Simmons, supra note 19, at 2 (showing that the number of restatements filed
by publicly traded firms quickly rose from 163 in 2001 to 681 in 2006).
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the year preceding SOX, there were 7,921 exchange-listed firms and
163 of those firms, or roughly 2 percent, issued accounting restate-
ments.178 Ten years later, in 2011, there were only 5,552 exchange-
listed firms, but 499 of those firms, or roughly 9 percent, issued re-
statements.179 Despite the vast increase in the sheer number of re-
statements and the increasing percentage of firms filing restatements,
the SEC has pursued only a handful of section 304 claims since SOX
was signed into law thirteen years ago. Most of these enforcement
actions were merely additional claims attached to more serious crimi-
nal charges and quite of few of these claims were eventually dropped
or settled by the SEC.180
However, now that recent court decisions have clarified some of
section 304's more troublesome ambiguities, the time for diffidence is
over. A growing number of courts have confirmed that the SEC can
disgorge improperly awarded bonuses and indecorously earned stock
profits without the burdensome task of proving misconduct on the
part of the CEO or CFO. Despite the lingering questions surrounding
the definition of misconduct and the extent of the monies susceptible
to disgorgement, the SEC has shown that it can be used as a crude,
but effective, weapon to compel CEOs and CFOs to return bonuses
and stock profits that were based on inaccurate information. For ex-
ample, when the SEC filed a section 304 action against the CEO of
Diebold Inc. in 2010, he quickly settled the case and agreed to reim-
burse $470,016 in cash bonuses, 30,000 shares of stock, and stock op-
tions for 85,000 shares of stock, even though there was no evidence he
was shown to be personally involved in the misconduct.181 The SEC
forced a similar settlement in 2011 with the CEO of Beazer Homes,
even though he was not personally involved in the misconduct.182
More recently, in the spring of 2015, top officers at SABA software
also quickly settled a similar case where there was no proof of per-
sonal involvement in the misconduct.' 83
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. McKenna, supra note 31.
181. SEC v. Diebold, Inc., Sarbanes-Oxley Act Release No. 21543 (June 2, 2010), https://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21543.htm.
182. Robbie Wheelan & Joann S. Lublin, Beazer CEO Will Give Back Incentive Pay in Settle-
ment, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870330090457
6178694027276166. Without admitting any wrongdoing, McCarthy agreed to reimburse Beazer
almost $6.5 million in cash bonuses and stock sale profits as well as numerous units of restricted
stock granted during the twelve months after the erroneous filing. Id.
183. Mary P. Hansen, SOX Section 304 Enforcement at the SEC's Whim?, LAw360 (February
20, 2015, 11:17 AM ET), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/623125/sox-section-304-enforcement-at-
the-sec-s-whim.
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Unfortunately, these examples of proactive enforcement are rare.
Internal wrangling among the SEC commissioners 84 suggests that the
majority of the commissioners seem content to abdicate their role as
enforcers of section 304. For example, in the "London whale" scan-
dal, there was clear misconduct and a subsequent restatement that re-
duced reported income by $459 million, yet the SEC made no attempt
to disgorge the bonuses or stock profits from the CEO or CFO. 85 In
another highly-publicized case, the SEC did not seek disgorgements
from top executives at Dell, Inc., even though the company itself ad-
mitted that restatements were required because of improper account-
ing adjustments that "appear to have been motivated by the objective
of attaining financial targets."1 86 In other cases where a section 304
disgorgement appears obvious, the SEC inexplicably chose to use its
prosecutorial discretion to exempt large portions of collectible
monies.' 8 7
The SEC's unwillingness to use section 304 in all but the most egre-
gious circumstances, and even then sometimes haphazardly deciding
not to enforce it against certain individuals,188 has betrayed the sense
of security it was supposed to have created for investors. Because pri-
vate parties cannot enforce section 304, the public should be able to
rely on the SEC to consistently bring these types of actions so that
exemptions once again become the exception. Failure to sufficiently
do so decreases the faith of the general public in the efforts of compa-
nies and the SEC to ensure financial reporting accuracy. Unless the
SEC begins to consistently use this section 304 against all companies
that issue restatements because of misconduct, the provision's original
184. Scannell, supra note 114; Westbrook, supra note 114.
185. Francine McKenna, The SEC's AgFeed Complaint: No Restatement Means No Sarbanes-
Oxley Clawback, RE: THE AUDITORS (Mar. 23, 2014), http://retheauditors.com/2014/03/23/the-
secs-agfeed-complaint-no-restatement-means-no-sarbanes-oxley-clawback/; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
In the Wake of the Whale, What's Changed?, The CLS Blue Sky Blog, (Oct. 10, 2013), http://
clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/10/10/in-the-wake-of-the-whale-whats-changed/.
186. Francine McKenna, Guest Lectures at Stanford Graduate School Business, RE: THE AUDI-
TORS (Feb. 22, 2014), http://retheauditors.com/2014/02/22/guest-lectures-at-stanford-graduate-
school-business/.
187. Morgenson, supra note 19, at BU1 (discussing cases against Navistar and Diebold Inc.);
see Francine McKenna, Huron Consulting, Its Executive and PwC; All's Well that Ends Well, RE:
THE AUDITORS (Jul. 23, 2012), http://retheauditors.com/2012/07/23/huron-consulting-its-execu
tives-and-pwc-alls-well-that-ends-well/ (discussing Huron Consulting Group, Inc.).
188. See Rockwood, supra note 65 ("[T]he SEC does not appear to have applied section
304(a) in a consistent manner from which anyone could glean any guidance - choosing to pursue
zealously the compensation of some clearly non-culpable executives while giving a pass to other,
equally non-culpable executives. The result has been a hodge-podge enforcement of section
304.").
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intent to ensure that CEOs and CFOs do not profit from erroneous
financial statements will never be realized.1 89
189. List, supra note 18, at 218-19.
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